I think the important distinction Kant makes is to get rid of the subjectivity in his intent argument. While, granted, it can be used by anyone, he seems to see it as there existing an absolute standard of moral and immoral, making the question of good or not-good intent completely regularized.
I'm not sure how I feel about that, though. I'm used to thinking about this kind of issue in Platonic terms (or worse, Augustinian ones), but as far as what I actually think, I don't know about an absolute standard for good and evil. That seems to predicate (or predicated upon) the existence of God, or some sort of divineness in the universe.
I think Isabella must have some idea of what she's saying. She really casts it (I'm thinking of the seduction scene) in terms of the standard virgin-martyr vs. (pagan) lustful judge mold. Which is really weird, because that usually leads to the conversion of said judge, where in this case, it leads to the fall of the judge from a Christian ideal… It's also interesting to consider how much of this Claudio might have planned when he asked Isabella to plead for him. Not what actually happened, of course, but I think he might have suspected that Angelo would be moved not only by Isabella's arguments.
It's unbelievable, the way Isabella argues at the end. (Or perhaps it isn't: I'm just guessing what the religious-moral standard would have been at the time). She's rejecting (or pretending to reject, at least) this central point of her doctrine: that the sinful thoughts do matter by themselves. And, in the play, they do matter. Part of Angelo's persona is not simply that he hasn't succombed to lust, but that he hasn't even experienced it. He's really upset when he starts to, and, perhaps one could even say that his problem is that he can't distinguish between having the intent and carrying out the intent. Both are equally sinful. So Isabella is making a very different point, and so distinguishing herself from him as less rigid, I suppose, here, when she takes the "modern" morally relativistic view. Although, she can only have this view because Angelo is repentant.
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timeasmymeasure
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Date: 2006-02-24 03:20 pm (UTC)I'm not sure how I feel about that, though. I'm used to thinking about this kind of issue in Platonic terms (or worse, Augustinian ones), but as far as what I actually think, I don't know about an absolute standard for good and evil. That seems to predicate (or predicated upon) the existence of God, or some sort of divineness in the universe.
I think Isabella must have some idea of what she's saying. She really casts it (I'm thinking of the seduction scene) in terms of the standard virgin-martyr vs. (pagan) lustful judge mold. Which is really weird, because that usually leads to the conversion of said judge, where in this case, it leads to the fall of the judge from a Christian ideal… It's also interesting to consider how much of this Claudio might have planned when he asked Isabella to plead for him. Not what actually happened, of course, but I think he might have suspected that Angelo would be moved not only by Isabella's arguments.
It's unbelievable, the way Isabella argues at the end. (Or perhaps it isn't: I'm just guessing what the religious-moral standard would have been at the time). She's rejecting (or pretending to reject, at least) this central point of her doctrine: that the sinful thoughts do matter by themselves. And, in the play, they do matter. Part of Angelo's persona is not simply that he hasn't succombed to lust, but that he hasn't even experienced it. He's really upset when he starts to, and, perhaps one could even say that his problem is that he can't distinguish between having the intent and carrying out the intent. Both are equally sinful. So Isabella is making a very different point, and so distinguishing herself from him as less rigid, I suppose, here, when she takes the "modern" morally relativistic view. Although, she can only have this view because Angelo is repentant.